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Abstract 
Microfinance (MF) and family planning (FP) are thought to be very important interventions in 
the promotion of human development and it has been suggested that MF has significant 
beneficent impacts on contraceptive adoption and fertility. Thus, several authors, e.g. Amin, 
Hill and Li (1995), Amin et al (1994 and 2001); Schuler, Hashemi and Riley (1997); Hashemi, 
Schuler and Riley (1996); Schuler and Hashemi (1994), using naive methods find that MF in 
Bangladesh increases contraceptive use and reduces fertility at the individual level, largely 
because MF empowers women. Pitt et al (1999 – henceforth PKML), however, using 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation find that MF is associated with decreases in 
contraceptive use especially when females borrow, and male borrowing decreases fertility, 
perhaps because fertility increasing income effects of MF outweigh substitution. Steele et al 
(2001), also using data from Bangladesh from around the same time as the PKML study, come 
to conclusions closer to the orthodoxy, arguing that PKML use an inappropriate metric for MF 
programme participation. In this paper we apply matching methods to our reconstruction of the 
PKML data to test whether other methods reproduce their results. We find that female 
borrowing substantially increases contraceptive use but has mainly no effects on fertility, while 
male borrowing has no effect on contraceptive use or on fertility; this contradicts some of the 
findings of PKML. Our results are shown to be vulnerable to unobservables, but there is no 
reason to believe that results on IV based methods are more reliable. 
                                                 
1 Postdoctoral fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, USA.  
2 Reader at the School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 
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Introduction 
Microfinance (MF) and family planning (FP) are important interventions in the 
promotion of human development and in the fight against poverty (Daley-Harris, 2002; 
Littlefield, Morduch and Hashemi, 2003; UNCDF, 2005; Cleland, Bernstein, et al, 2006; 
Cleland, 2009). MF is not just about credit; it encompasses other services such as 
savings, insurance, and remittances, and non-financial services such as financial 
literacy training (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005) and it is now often 
combined with other interventions, for example providing information and advice 
about contraception and fertility (Leatherman et al, 2011). 
It is often argued that access to credit improves women’s economic opportunities and 
affects their FP by increasing the value of their time (Desai and Tarozzi, 2009; Pitt et al, 
1999; Buttenheim, 2006). However, it is unclear whether an increase in the value of their 
time has positive or negative effects on fertility because while it makes reproduction 
more costly because time consuming, it may be associated with an opposite effect due 
to concomitant rise in income. A positive effect on fertility is more likely when the 
additional time women spend on economic activities leads to a significant increase in 
income which in turn increases the demand for children on the assumption that 
children are normal goods (Pitt et al, 1999, p. 2). In other words, the direction of the 
impact of MF on fertility is unclear (Desai and Tarozzi, 2009) and few studies 
(discussed below) have tried to test this causal link between MF and FP decisions.  
Literature review 
MF may have beneficent impacts on a range of socio-economic outcomes but the 
empirical evidence so far is mixed and unconvincing. There have been four 
unsystematic reviews of microfinance impact (Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Gaile and 
Foster, 1996; Goldberg, 2005; Odell, 2010) indicating that, although anecdotes and other 
inspiring stories (Todd, 1996) show that microfinance can make a real difference in the 
lives of those served, rigorous quantitative evidence on the nature, magnitude and 
balance of microfinance impact is still scarce and inconclusive (Armendáriz de Aghion 
and Morduch, 2005 and 2010). This evidence is corroborated by two recent systematic 
reviews on the impact of MF (Stewart et al, 2011; Duvendack et al, 2011) which argue  
that most MF impact evaluations suffer from weak methodologies which fail to 
adequately control for self-selection and non-random programme placement bias 
(particularly argued by Duvendack et al, 2011), thus adversely affecting the reliability 
of impact estimates , this in turn may have contributed to misconceptions of the actual 
effects of MF programmes (Roy, 2010; Bateman, 2010; Dichter and Harper, 2007). 
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Few studies have investigated the causal link between microfinance, contraceptive use, 
and fertility; until recently the ones that do focus on the case of Bangladesh 
(Buttenheim, 2006). It has been suggested there are significant beneficent impacts of MF 
on contraceptive use and fertility. Thus Amin, Hill and Li (1995), Amin et al (1994 and 
2001); Schuler, Hashemi and Riley (1997); Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996); Schuler 
and Hashemi (1994), find that in Bangladesh MF increases contraceptive use and 
reduces fertility at the individual level, putatively because of the effects MF lent to 
women has on empowering them. It is assumed that women prefer contraceptive use 
and fewer children than men in this patriarchal society. Pitt et al (1999 – henceforth 
PKML), however, find that MF is not associated with an increase in contraceptive use 
or decrease in fertility, in particular for female participants in MF (PKML, p. 1). PKML 
use a complex two-stage instrumental variables (IV) estimation, arguing that other 
studies, such as those referred to above, do not control for self-selection and 
programme placement biases3; PKML’s study, differentiates by gender of borrower, 
finding significant negative effects on contraceptive use and mainly no effects on 
fertility when females borrow and no effects on contraceptive use and significantly 
negative effects on fertility from male borrowing, strikingly contrary to the usual 
expectations.  
Steele et al (2001), using panel data from Bangladesh produced around the same time 
as those analysed by PKML, in a pipeline design similar to Coleman (1999), employ 
fixed and random effects panel estimation methods to control for self-selection and 
programme placement bias. They obtain results which are contradictory to those of 
PKML and conclude that MF has a positive impact on contraceptive use. Steele et al 
(2001, p. 280) rationalise their results by arguing that the membership of a MF group, 
which is the (dichotomous) variable they use, is more appropriate than the amount 
borrowed, which is the variable used by PKML to represent MF participation, because 
it more appropriately proxies female empowerment. In their data, Steele et al (2001) 
have cases of women who are members of the MF group but have not borrowed, but 
who, they argue, nevertheless may be empowered by group meetings and solidarity. 
Thus using a dummy variable for membership (empowerment) Steele et al (2001) find 
significant impacts of MF membership on contraceptive use. The amount borrowed, the 
indicator used by PKML may only proxy income changes, and miss these wider effects.  
                                                 
3 MF participants commonly self-select into microfinance, i.e. the assignment process in non-random, and 
thus they differ from non-participants in observable and unobservable characteristics. The locations of 
programmes are also chosen in a non-random way and therefore differ from other places that could be 
used as controls (Coleman, 1999; PnK). 
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Buttenheim (2006) supports the view of Steele et al (2001), that membership (or 
participation) is the more appropriate indicator, but extends this, arguing that the level 
of MF participation in the community or the availability of the MF programme at the 
community level is the more appropriate measure to assess the impact of MF on 
contraceptive use, especially when network and spill-over effects on the local 
community are present (Buttenheim, 2006, p. 10). Moreover, the microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in the two data sets are different4; in Steele et al (2001) women (only) 
are members of groups facilitated by Save the Children USA and the Bangladeshi NGO 
ASA (Rutherford, 2009) while in the PKML data males and females are members of 
Grameen Bank (GB), the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) or the 
Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) groups. Save the Children USA had 
quite intensive interactions of a putatively empowering nature with their members, 
while ASA were largely focused on microcredit alone, with likely different implications 
for female empowerment5. The PKML sample includes members of GB, BRDB and 
BRAC6, which each espoused rather different interactions with group members; 
although in each case some might be considered empowerment related (c.f. the GB 16 
affirmations) they are unlikely to have had such powerful empowering effects as Save 
the Children USA. Moreover, both indicators (i.e. membership and amount borrowed) 
are at best indirect evidence of empowerment and income respectively.  
Desai and Tarozzi (2009) discuss this literature and report an RCT conducted in 
Ethiopia, with data from before and after the intervention with three different 
treatment groups and a control group7. Randomisation occurred at the village level. 
The first treatment group had access to microcredit as well as family planning services, 
the second and third treatment groups had access to either microcredit or family 
planning and the fourth group did not have access to either of these services. The 
authors find that none of these interventions - alone or in combination - had any impact 
on increased contraceptive use compared to the control group. They conclude that the 
family planning intervention provided the wrong contraceptive methods and hence the 
                                                 
4 The sample of the World Bank data used in PKML is drawn from 87 villages from 29 thanas across rural 
Bangladesh while the Save the Children USA/ASA data used by Steele et al (2001) comes from 15 villages 
from Nasirnagar thana in Eastern Bangladesh. 
5 However, the number of women in the sample joining Save the Children USA was relatively small 
(‚the estimates for contrasts of SC-ASA membership or non-membership with SC membership should be 
treated with caution‚(Steele et al, 2001, p. 273)). 
6 As well as borrowers from other sources, which are neglected in PKML. Some MF borrowers also 
borrow from these other sources (Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2011). 
7 RCTs are sometimes taken as the ‚gold standard‛ for impact evaluation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; 
Karlan and Appel, 2011); this is contested (Deaton, 2010; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones et al, 2011). 
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lack of impact. Women in the study area preferred injectibles while pills and condoms 
were offered. There are possible limitations of this study. As argued by Leatherman et 
al (2011), the control group could have been contaminated by spill-over effects from the 
treatment groups or by the availability of other microcredit or family planning services. 
In addition, the households during baseline and follow-up surveys are not the same, 
new households were sampled in the follow-up survey, thus making the study a panel 
of villages and not of households.       
This leaves the issue of the relationship between MF, contraceptive use and fertility 
decidedly unclear, yet it is of continuing importance (Buttenheim, 2006); there seems to 
be evidence both for and against beneficent pathways between MF and contraceptive 
use and fertility, warranting further exploration of these issues. At the theoretical level 
it has been argued that there are potential conflicts within households with regard to 
FP decisions. Commonly it is believed that men prefer more children and thus might 
discourage their wives from using contraception, while women often have to hide 
contraceptives from their husbands (Ashraf, Field and Lee, 2010). Angeles, Guilkey and 
Mroz (2005) and Gertler and Molyneaux (1994) argue that improved education as well 
as the development of better economic opportunities increase contraceptive use and 
decrease fertility. Buttenheim (2006) is more critical of the idea of links between 
education and contraceptive use and points towards other factors that can also play a 
role. She finds that older women are more likely to use contraceptives, as well as 
women living in urban areas. The desire to have children also appears to be driven by 
economic factors. For example, in Buttenheim’s (2006) sample the desire to have more 
children in 2000 is higher than in 1993 and 1997 irrespective of age and education level 
of the women interviewed. She speculates that this could have been due to Indonesia’s 
slow recovery from the economic crisis in 1998 (Buttenheim, 2006, p. 15). Hence, 
attributing the changes in contraceptive use and fertility to impacts of MF is a complex 
and challenging task, since many social, economic and cultural factors are likely to 
influence FP decisions (Livi-Bacci and de Santis, 1998).  
In this paper, we seek to assess the robustness of the results found by PKML using 
another estimation method - propensity score matching (PSM) – in part because the 
ability of establishing causality in the PnK research design has been contested 
(Roodman and Morduch, 2009 – henceforth RnM), and partly to explore the contrast 
with Steele et al (2001). PSM may have advantages over random coefficients IV 
methods produce, which rely on largely untestable assumptions and model 
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dependence8, by balancing the covariates in the samples of treatment and control 
groups (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004, p. 276).  
It is only partially possible test Steele et al’s (2001) assertions that membership is more 
likely to show positive effects on contraceptive use and negative ones on fertility than 
amount borrowed because all members are borrowers in the PKML data. The PKML 
dataset and estimation strategy is largely the same as that used by PnK. The data and 
analysis has been difficult to replicate; however, RnM replicated the key PnK studies9, 
using similar estimation strategies but different software, and come to the same results 
as PnK, but conclude differently, as noted above.  
‘decisive statistical evidence in favor of *the idea that microcredit alleviates 
poverty, smoothes household expenditure and lessens the pinch of hunger 
especially when women are involved in borrowing+ is absent from these studies’ 
(RnM, p. 40)10.  
Duvendack (2010) and Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2011 - henceforth DPJ) using 
PSM and sensitivity analysis conclude that the very modest and mixed impacts they 
find are highly vulnerable to unobservables – such as entrepreneurial ability, 
motivation, risk preferences, and so on - which may account for both MFI membership 
and the impacts observed. These difficulties suggest that it is important to replicate the 
results of the more recent papers by Pitt and co-authors (1999, 2003, and 2006 (which 
uses the 1998/99 follow-up data)), since they use broadly the same data and similar 
estimation strategies and software11. Ideally we would want to re-investigate this set of 
studies but it is beyond the scope of this paper and hence we restrict ourselves to the 
study by PKML on contraceptive use and fertility.  
Replication and reproduction12 are an important part of scientific practice, even in 
economics, without which results cannot be taken as robust (Hamermesh, 2007; 
                                                 
8 The assumption that the estimation model captures entirely the effects of all potentially confounding 
variables (e.g. DiPrete and Gangl, 2004, p. 275). 
9 RnM do not replicate Chemin (2008) or a few other studies that used the PnK data (Khandker, 1996, 
2000; Pitt et al, 1999; Pitt, 2000; McKernan, 2002; Pitt and Khandker, 2002; Pitt et al, 2003; Menon, 2006; 
Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006). 
10 However, RnM’s results have been refuted (see Pitt, 2011a and 2011b) but the debate is ongoing and 
the interested reader is referred to Roodman’s blog: http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/ for updates. 
Roodman maintains the basic conclusion that PnK do not establish causality due to the unsatisfactory 
research (sample) design of the PnK study. 
11 RnM and DPJ also replicate Khandker (2005) who uses the 1998/99 data, but also find replication 
unsatisfactory, and cannot confirm the claims of either PnK or Khandker.  
12 While used in various ways in this literature (McCullough et al, 2006) we consider the terms replication 
and reproduction to cover applying the same data construction and statistical methods to a given raw 
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McCullough et al, 2006), perhaps especially when there appear to be contradictions 
with much other relevant work. Economics papers applying complex statistical 
methods can have errors of both variable construction (data manipulation) and 
statistical estimation (Dewald et al, 1986; McCullough et al, 2006; McCullough et al, 
2008). The application of different methods can lead to different conclusions with 
practical relevance (op. cit.). To allow replication, good documentation of the study 
design and data are required, and there should be access to the data, and details of their 
variable construction and analysis13.  
As noted above, the findings of PKML differ from most other findings of the relation 
between MF and contraception for Bangladesh, or indeed elsewhere; a similar 
conclusion as to the general evidence of MF impact and contraceptive use and women’s 
empowerment has been drawn by Buttenheim (2006) for Indonesia using an apparently 
robust set of data and estimation method. Indeed Pitt et al (2006) find MF borrowing 
empowers females using data on their original sample collected at a later date. The 
explanation given by Pitt et al (2006), which fits better the orthodoxy - that MF 
empowers women -, relies on an extended and perhaps somewhat tendentious 
argument to reconcile the PKML findings with regard to contraception and fertility 
with their later findings on female empowerment. It is possible, however, given the 
critique of the data and methods used in the PnK oeuvre that the original empirical 
findings cannot be replicated, or are found not to be robust, which would go some way 
to resolving this paradox without recourse to asserting the dominance of the income 
over substitution effects. This paper furthers the critical discussion of the extensive and 
influential set of studies using the PnK data set and possibly helps to resolve some of 
the puzzles regarding links between MF and well-being raised by them. 
Thus, to summarise, the objective of this paper is to re-investigate the findings of PKML 
who use data first presented in PnK. We follow the approach by DPJ and apply PSM 
                                                                                                                                                            
data set, application of different statistical methods to the same data set, and application of the same or 
different methods to a different data set which is arguably equivalent to the original study. However, in 
this paper we use reproduction to apply to use of different methods on a given (raw) data set, and 
replication to mean using the same (or very similar) methods. Data, or variable constructions may differ 
because of definitional differences using the same concept of the variables (replication), or different 
concepts of the variables (reproduction).   
13 The American Economic Review (AER), for example, requires its authors to make their data sets and 
code available which are then uploaded onto a website maintained by the AER especially for this 
purpose. Authors have been compliant with this policy so far but can opt out in case their data are 
proprietary and/or confidential (Hamermesh, 2007, p. 717). This is not the common practice in 
economics, although increasingly advocated (Burman et al, 2010). 
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and sensitivity analysis to the data to triangulate these findings and obtain more 
refined impact estimates. 
The impact of microfinance in Bangladesh: the case of PnK 
PnK use data from a World Bank funded survey in three waves in 1991-199214 on three 
leading microfinance group-lending programmes in Bangladesh, namely GB, BRAC 
and BRDB (PnK, p. 959). A quasi-experimental design was used which sampled target 
(having a choice to participate/being eligible) and non-target households (having no 
choice to participate/not being eligible) from villages with microfinance programme 
(treatment villages) and non-programme villages (control villages).  
The survey was conducted in 87 villages from 29 thanas15; the treatment villages were 
randomly selected from a list of villages provided by the MFIs’ local offices and the 
control villages were randomly selected from the governments’ village census; 1,798 
households were selected out of which 1,538 were labelled target households, 
putatively cultivating less than 0.5 acres at the time of joining the MFI16, and 260 were 
non-target households (PnK, p. 974). According to PnK (p. 974), out of those 1,538 
households, 905 effectively participated in microfinance (59%). The three survey waves 
(henceforth R1-3) were timed to account for seasonal variations, (Pitt, 2000, p. 28-29). 
The study focuses on measuring the impact of microfinance participation by gender on 
indicators such as labour supply, school enrolment, expenditure per capita and non-
land asset ownership. PnK find that microcredit has significant positive impacts on 
many of these indicators and find larger positive impacts when women are involved in 
borrowing. For example, ‘annual household consumption expenditure, *…], increased 
18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by women from these credit programs 
[GB, BRAC, BRDB+, compared with 11 taka for men’ (PnK, p. 988)17. 
                                                 
14 In areas not affected by the cyclone of April 1991. 
15 A thana (literally police station, also known as upazila) is a unit of administration in Bangladesh; in 
1985 there were 495 upazilas (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1985) and 507 upazilas in 2001 
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2004). 
16 See below for discussion of the fuzzy nature of the eligibility criterion applied in practice. 
17 A follow-up data set (henceforth R4) was collected in 1998-1999 re-surveying the same households that 
were already interviewed in R1-3 and some new households increasing the overall sample size to 2,599 
households (Khandker, p. 271). Khandker uses standard panel analysis to conclude that microcredit has 
positive impacts on the poorest and reduces poverty among programme participants, especially when 
women are involved in borrowing, and thus confirms PnK’s headline results. However, RnM’s 
replication of Khandker casts doubts about Khandker’s approach and findings (RnM, p. 39). Using our, 
slightly different data we concur with RnM that panel estimation does not show clear evidence of 
microfinance impact. We do not further discuss this approach here. 
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PnK adopt an estimation strategy for assessing the impact of microfinance participation 
involving comparisons of ‘treated’ and ‘non-treated’ households in ‘treated’ villages 
and ‘non-treated’ households in ‘non-treated’ (control) villages. Treatment refers to 
participating in the loan programme of one of the selected MFIs; at the household level 
this varies according to the gender of the borrower, and at the village level to the 
presence of the MFI in the village. However, comparing households in treatment and 
control villages is not sufficient for obtaining impact estimates for microfinance 
programme participation because the villages differ (there is programme placement 
bias18) and households commonly self-select into microfinance. In this type of group-
based lending individuals select themselves, can be selected (or excluded) by their 
peers and/or by microfinance loan officers, giving rise to selection bias.  
In principle all the MFIs operate an eligibility criterion that participating households 
should be cultivating19 less than 0.5 acres of land at the time of recruitment into the MFI 
programme, so that only households meeting this criterion are eligible. In fact, the 
eligibility criterion is not strictly met by quite a few microfinance borrowers (Morduch, 
1998), so that there is a gap between participation and eligibility20 and this raises further 
doubts about PnK’s estimation strategy.  
In brief, PnK use the (de facto) participation criterion as their identification strategy, 
assuming that it is exogenous. They sample treatment and control villages containing 
non-target/landed and target/landless households. PnK’s (ideal) identification strategy 
can be understood graphically by looking at Figure 1.  
                                                 
18 The assumption was that MFIs choose more remote and backward villages (PnK; Coleman, 1999). 
Hence, microfinance impact may vary according to village type. 
19 There is some confusion about whether the eligibility criterion is cultivated (operated) or owned land, 
and whether this includes homestead land. 
20 Thus there are de jure (cultivating less than 0.5 acres), and de facto (participating) eligibility categories; 
this is discussed further below. Some 42% of de facto MFI members are not eligible by the 0.5 acres rule. 
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PnK suggest that their estimation strategy is comparing outcomes across the 
discontinuity between participant (eligible) and non-participant (not eligible 
households in treatment and control villages; that is, at the discontinuity or cut-off 
point at the boundary between group B and A in control villages, and between group D 
to C in treatment villages (Figure 1). The difference between these two sets of 
comparisons is estimated by applying village-level fixed-effects to account for 
unobserved differences between treatment and control villages.  
The application of an eligibility criterion as an identification strategy is plausible 
provided it is strictly enforced. However, as Morduch (1998) points out, mistargeting 
occurred21 (see also Ravallion, 2008, p. 3818; Chemin, 2008, p. 465). Group D contains 
participants who own more than 0.5 acres of land. Pitt rationalises this by claiming that 
the value of land of treated households which cultivate/possess more than 0.5 acres is 
so low that the value of the land of these households is effectively less than the median 
                                                 
21 Pitt (1999) refuted Morduch’s (1998) claims and provided evidence supporting PnK’s earlier findings. 
This debate was revisited by RnM and DPJ and taken up by Pitt (2011a and 2011b). It is not central to this 
paper to elaborate on this debate; instead the interested reader is referred to RnM and DPJ. 
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Figure 1: Intended identification strategy 
Source: Authors illustration based on Morduch (1998) and Chemin (2008).  
Notes: This diagram ignores that the eligibility criterion was not strictly (literally) 
enforced. Thus the actual strategy used (de facto) participation. 
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value of 0.5 acres of average land; however, in control villages (groups A and B) 
households were categorised as eligible based on the less than 0.5 acres of cultivated 
land alone22. RnM were eventually able to replicate  the original PnK data if not 
exactly23, as independently did DPJ, but come to different conclusions as to the claim of 
causality.  
Chemin (2008) using PSM came to different conclusions as to the impacts of MF from 
PnK. DPJ could not replicate Chemin’s (2008) data closely, or findings, although they to 
come to conclusions different from PnK, adding that their results remain highly 
vulnerable to unobservables. DPJ though doubt the ability of the PnK data to provide 
convincing evidence of impact attributable to MFIs. 
There are further concerns about PnK’s study and their substantive results which are 
elaborated in more detail by DPJ. In brief, most microfinance impact evaluations are 
designed on the assumption that other formal and informal credit organisations are 
absent and would not have entered the financial markets in the absence of MFIs. 
However, this is not what the data show (or found in other studies conducted around 
the time of or soon after the PnK survey (Fernando, 1997; Jain and Mansuri, 2003; Zeller 
et al, 2001)). Households in the PnK data obtain loans not only from MFIs but also from 
other formal and informal sources and those with different portfolios will have 
different observable and unobservable characteristics. Thus, a comparison of (eligible) 
participants with (eligible) non-participants will include among the participants those 
who also borrow from other sources, and similarly among the control group(s); these 
groups will be quite heterogeneous, as will any impacts of microfinance borrowing. 
While it might be desirable to compare more homogenous sub-groups separately so 
one could distinguish differences in impacts and probably obtain more precise and 
statistically significant results, this is constrained by sample sizes in existing data sets. 
DPJ explore these issues in a separate paper and it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
elaborate this further. 
                                                 
22 This issue is addressed in more depth in DPJ.  
23 Apparently the data sets and code used for PnK were archived on CD-ROMs which are no longer 
readable (correspondence from Pitt to Roodman on February 28, 2008). Others who have used these data 
using similar procedures to PnK cannot supply their data or code (see personal communication with 
McKernan on April 16, 2009). Hence, it remains moot as to whether the differences between PnK and 
RnM are due to (1) differences in the raw data used; (2) differences in variable construction; or, (3) 
differences in the statistical estimations. (1) and (2) cannot be assessed, but those with the appropriate 
skills can assess RnM. 
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Estimation strategy 
The standard approach to solving the evaluation problem is to use an IV approach 
which claims to control for selection on observables as well as unobservables (Heckman 
and Vytlacil, 2007; Basu et al, 2007). The main goal of the IV method is to identify a 
variable or a set of variables, i.e. instruments, that influence the decision to participate 
in a programme but at the same time do not have an effect on the outcome equation. 
Only when adequate instruments can be identified, then the IV approach is an effective 
strategy for estimating causal effects (Morgan and Winship, 2007). However, in many 
cases weak instruments are employed which can have adverse effects on the accuracy 
of IV estimates (as argued by Pitt et al, 1999 and Steele et al, 2001). These drawbacks of 
the IV methods suggest using a different approach to estimating causal effects, in this 
case PSM.  
First we replicate the variable constructions of PKML24 (see DPJ for further details) and 
then apply PSM using MF membership, rather than amount borrowed, to explain 
contraceptive use and fertility.  PSM matches participants to non-participants based on 
a ‚propensity score‛ computed generally from a logit or probit model (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2005 and 2008) to predict the probability (the ‚propensity score‛) of 
programme participation (Ravallion, 2001). The samples of participants and the 
matched non-participants are pooled to estimate programme participation. PSM 
accounts for selection on observables but fails to control for selection on unobservables 
(Smith and Todd, 2005). Selection on unobservables or ‘hidden bias’ as Rosenbaum 
(2002) calls them, are driven by unobserved variables that influence treatment decisions 
as well as potential outcomes (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Matching estimators are 
commonly not robust to selection on unobservables. Hence, to test the robustness of 
our matching estimates, we also apply sensitivity analysis. 
                                                 
24 Most of the data, including questionnaires and variable codes are (at the time of writing this paper) 
available on the World Bank website ( 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:21470820~pa
gePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html) but replication remains a challenge. Firstly, the 
survey forms and variable descriptions are problematic; secondly certain data necessary for replication 
were (and others are) missing. It is not possible to be sure that the data posted are indeed exactly the 
same as those analysed by PnK, but the main problems probably lie not in variations in the raw data but 
in subsequent manipulations, variable constructions, and analytical procedures. Some of these data such 
as data on consumer price indices, sampling weights and landholding details were obtained after 
contacting the authors (either by Roodman, or ourselves). The replication exercise reported here was 
greatly facilitated by RnM who have made all their data and codes available: 
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422302. The data and variable construction are 
mainly in SQL, although statistical analysis is in STATA; our data manipulation and analysis is all in 
STATA. 
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For PSM, we first estimate of the likelihood of microfinance participation (propensity 
score) to match control to treatment cases using the propensity score, and then compute 
the treatment effects for the various comparison groups. Our logit model specification 
follows the model set out by Pitt et al (1999)25. The model can be expressed as follows:  
(1)                                     + δ    
Where: 
     = participating household 
    = vector of individual-specific variables 
    = vector of household-specific variables 
     = village-level fixed-effects 
The dependent variable (      in the model presented in equation (1) represents eligible 
participants (i) in village (j); a value of 1 is assumed when an individual participates 
and a value of 0 if not.     is a vector of individual-specific variables such as age and 
marital status, and     is a vector of household-specific variables representing variables 
such as education and wealth.      is a vector of village level variables. All estimations 
use village-level fixed-effects. 
Results 
As noted above replicating the PnK data is not a trivial task, however we are able to 
reproduce to a fair degree of accuracy the main descriptive statistics of PKML (see 
Appendix 1); where our figures differ from PKML we prefer ours because they 
triangulate to a very high degree of accuracy with RnM although using different 
software. Remaining differences in the variables are due to differences in interpretation 
of the raw data rather than differences in data manipulations (see Appendix 3 for 
details on the remaining discrepancies). 
The logit specification follows that of PKML as illustrated in Table 1, the descriptive 
statistics can be found in Appendix 1.   
                                                 
25 The logit specification can have important effects on the matches and on estimated impacts. We do not 
go into the implications this has in this paper because our aim is to assess the robustness of the PKML 
results, so we use their model, and due to constraints of space. 
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Table 1: Logistic regression model for MF participation using PKML’s model 
specification 
Independent variables PKML’s specifications 
Age (years) 0.084*** 
 
0.000 
Age household head (years) -0.033*** 
 
0.000 
Highest education any -0.117*** 
male household member 0.004 
Household land (decimals) -0.004*** 
 
0.000 
Has any primary school? -0.495** 
 
0.024 
Midwife available? -0.561* 
 
0.096 
Price of rice 1.113*** 
 
0.000 
Price of wheat flour -0.548** 
 
0.050 
Price of mustard oil 0.092** 
0.041 
Average female wage -0.060** 
0.031 
Average male wage -0.122*** 
0.000 
Village dummies Yes 
Number of observations 1841 
Pseudo R-squared 0.393 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes:  p-values in italics. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Data round 1 is 
used. The following control variables are used in PKML’s model specification as well: maximum 
education household head, highest education any female household member, sex of households head, 
landholdings household head parents, landholdings household head brother, landholdings household 
head sister, landholdings household head spouse parents, landholdings household head spouse brother, 
landholdings household head spouse sister, no spouse in household, nontarget household, access to 
rural health care, access to family planning centre, price of hen egg, price of milk, price of potato, dummy 
for no female wage, distance to bank (km), all insignificant. Descriptive statistics for all logit variables 
can be found in Appendix 1. 
In this specification age of respondent, age of household head, highest education of any 
male household member, household land, price of rice and average male wage are 
statistically significant at 1%. Has any primary school, price of mustard oil, average 
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female wage and price of wheat flour are significant at 5% and access to midwife is 
significant at 10%. The pseudo R-squared is rather low at 0.393. A low pseudo R-
squared will have implications for the quality of the matches and thus the robustness of 
the impact estimates, and consequently may have implications for the conclusions we 
draw.  
Table 2: PSM and covariate balancing 
  Mean Bias 
(%) 
% 
Reduction 
in |Bias| 
t-test 
Independent 
variables 
Sample Treated Control p>|t| 
Age (years) Unmatched 31.936 28.799 35.8  0.000 
 
Matched 31.936 31.840 1.1 96.9 0.872 
Age household head 
(years) 
Unmatched 41.143 41.543 -3.4  0.545 
 
Matched 41.143 41.200 -0.5 85.8 0.937 
Highest education 
any 
Unmatched 2.470 3.417 -25.3  0.000 
male household 
member 
Matched 2.470 2.455 0.4 98.4 0.947 
Household land 
(decimals) 
Unmatched 39.745 113.88 -25.4  0.000 
 
Matched 39.745 43.372 -1.2 95.1 0.579 
Has any primary 
school? 
Unmatched 0.697 0.691 1.4  0.803 
 
Matched 0.697 0.694 0.8 44.4 0.908 
Midwife available? Unmatched 0.751 0.641 24.1  0.000 
 
Matched 0.751 0.745 1.4 94.2 0.821 
Price of rice Unmatched 10.552 10.532 3.1  0.572 
 
Matched 10.552 10.542 1.6 48.9 0.810 
Price of wheat flour Unmatched 9.107 9.094 1.6  0.763 
 
Matched 9.107 9.084 2.8 -73.7 0.671 
Price of mustard oil Unmatched 53.026 53.771 -17.4  0.001 
Matched 53.026 53.279 -5.9 66.0 0.390 
Average female 
wage 
Unmatched 17.584 18.199 -9.2  0.097 
Matched 17.584 17.523 0.9 90.0 0.887 
Average male wage Unmatched 35.998 36.906 -13.2  0.015 
Matched 35.998 36.108 -1.6 87.9 0.806 
Source: Authors calculations. 
The matching process leads to a balancing26 of the independent variables between the 
treatment and control samples by restricting the control sample to increase its similarity 
to the treatment sample. Table 2 presents the results of covariate balancing and 
                                                 
26 Balancing in this context means having an acceptable (small) difference between the mean (or other 
statistic) of the covariates of the treated and untreated sample (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).  
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presents the mean values for treated and controls before and after the matching 
process. There are clear differences in the mean values among treated and controls 
before and after matching but the results in Table 2 indicate a reduction of bias for most 
variables that were significant in the logit model outlined in Table 1. In other words, 
the matching process has led to a sample with more balanced covariates between 
treatment and control groups, in some cases reducing bias by more than 90%. One way 
to assess the suitability of the matched data set for estimating impact is to look at the 
distribution of propensity scores to examine the degree of overlap; Figure 2 displays 
the propensity scores of de facto eligible women (currently married 14-50 year old) and 
the matched control sample including non-MFI eligible women27 from both treatment 
and control villages and de facto eligible persons in treatment villages28. This shows 
considerable common support although the central tendencies of the two groups is 
quite different, suggesting that the matching is not entirely successful29. 
                                                 
27 Some households have both male and female borrowers while others have either a male or a female 
MFI borrower, or none. As noted above, some households, including some who borrow from MFIs, 
borrow from other formal or informal sources. We found no cases in the data of individuals, or 
households, borrowing from more than one MFI, although other quantitative data (Zeller et al, 2001) and 
qualitative studies Fernando, (1997) report this to be common. 
28 As noted by Morduch (1998), we cannot know who would be de facto eligible in control villages. 
29 We intend to pursue this idea at a later date using ‚coarse exact matching ‚ (King et al, 2011) which is 
thought to have considerable advantages over PSM, although at the expense of discarding a greater 
number of treatment cases that cannot be matched (Blackwell et al, 2009).  
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Figure 2: Distribution of propensity scores for participants and eligible non-
participants across treatment and control villages  
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
To get an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), presented in 
Table 3 and Table 4, we simply take the mean difference of the matched samples. Error! 
Reference source not found.Table 3 lists the impact estimates for microcredit 
participation for all participants (male and female) and Table 4 provides impact 
estimates for female and male30 participants separately. We apply two different 
matching algorithms, i.e. nearest neighbour matching and kernel matching31. 
                                                 
30 The effect on female contraceptive use of having a male borrower in the household. In both cases we 
include cases with both male and female MF borrowers in the same household. 
31 The decision for using those algorithms was made in an arbitrary way since the literature in this area is 
not yet very developed. Morgan and Winship (2007, p. 109) argue that kernel matching which was first 
introduced by Heckman et al (1998) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) appears to be the most 
efficient and preferred algorithm. In addition, 1-nearest neighbour matching was chosen for its 
popularity which is probably due to its being easy to understand and comparatively easy to implement. 
We present only the kernel matching estimates with a bandwidth of 0.05 but also used bandwidths 0.01 
and 0.02. 
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Table 3: Matching estimates of households with female and male borrowers 
Outcome variables MF participants vs eligible non-participants 
 1-Nearest neighbour 
matching 
Kernel matching, 
0.0532 
Contraceptive use by currently married 
women aged 14-30 
0.071** 0.056** 
Contraceptive use by currently married 
women aged 14-50 
0.135*** 0.115*** 
Contraceptive use by currently married 
women aged 30-50 
0.084*** 0.075*** 
Any child born in last 4 years to currently 
married women aged 14-30 (yes=1; no=0) 
0.028 0.020 
Any child born in last 4 years to currently 
married women aged 14-50 (yes=1; no=0) 
0.024 0.019 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
STATA routine psmatch233 using the logit model outlined in Table 1 is used. Standard errors (not 
reported) are bootstrapped. 
The 1-nearest neighbour estimate of the impact of MF borrowing on the probability of 
contraceptive use  is 0.071 (Table 3) indicating that MF participants (pooling across 
gender of borrowers) aged 14-30 are 7.1% significantly (at 5%) more likely to use 
contraceptives than matched non-participants. The kernel matching estimate indicates 
a 5.6% higher level of contraceptive use for participants than for matched non-
participants at a 5% significance level. The impacts of MF on contraceptive use for the 
age group 14-50 and 30-50 are larger than for the 14-30- group and are consistently 
significant at 1% and vary between 7.5% to 13.5%34. The results for fertility variables for 
both age groups are negative and insignificant, and thus we cannot reach any strong 
conclusions as to the impact of MF on fertility. Our PSM results cannot confirm the 
general view of the literature that MF reduces fertility but does support the view that 
MF appears to increase contraceptive use 
                                                 
32 As mentioned in the previous footnote, 5-nearest neighbour matching as well as kernel matching with 
bandwidths 0.01 and 0.02 were applied but the results obtained from the various algorithms and 
bandwidths did not differ significantly from each other and confirm the results presented in Table 3. 
33 psmatch2 was developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003), we also used pscore developed Becker and 
Ichino (2002) as a robustness check. The results obtained did not vary significantly.  
34 PKML investigate contraceptive use for the ages 14-30 and 14-50 only. However, Buttenheim (2006) 
argues that contraceptive use is higher among older women and thus we investigate this claim and add a 
variable for contraceptive use looking at the ages 30-50. 
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Table 4: Matching estimates of impact segregated by gender 
Outcome variables MF participants vs eligible non-participants 
 1-Nearest neighbour 
matching 
Kernel matching, 
0.0535 
Contraceptive use by currently 
married women aged 14-30 
Women 0.047 0.055** 
Men -0.017 -0.007 
Contraceptive use by currently 
married women aged 14-50 
Women 0.094** 0.108*** 
Men -0.028 -0.018 
Contraceptive use by currently 
married women aged 30-50 
Women 0.067** 0.069*** 
Men -0.017 -0.023 
Any child born in last 4 years to 
currently married women aged 
14-30 (yes=1; no=0) 
Women 0.036 0.030 
Men -0.034 0.011 
Any child born in last 4 years to 
currently married women aged 
14-50 (yes=1; no=0) 
Women 0.034 0.036 
Men 0.024 0.047 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Notes: *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
STATA routine psmatch236 using the logit model outlined in Table 1 is used. Standard errors (not 
reported) are bootstrapped. 
Table 4 presents the results by gender of borrower to test the claim that effects on 
women borrowers are different to those on male borrowers. This table shows that MF 
membership is significantly positively associated with contraceptive use for female 
borrowers across all age ranges, but more statistically significant for the older age 
ranges. The impacts on fertility for both male and female borrowers are predominantly 
positive, but statistically insignificant for both age ranges. Thus contrary to PKML we 
find that female borrowing does have significantly positive effects on contraceptive use 
and that male borrowing has largely positive but insignificant effects on fertility. 
However, we concur with PKML’s finding that male borrowing has no effects on 
contraceptive use across all ages and that female borrowing has mainly positive but 
insignificant effects across both fertility outcome variables.  
                                                 
35 As in the case of the results presented in Table 3, 5-nearest neighbour matching as well as kernel 
matching with bandwidth 0.01 and 0.02 were applied in addition to 0.05 but the various algorithms and 
bandwidths results did not differ significantly and thus only the results using a bandwidth of 0.05 are 
shown here. 
36 As before, robustness checks were conducted using pscore. The results obtained did not vary 
significantly.  
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Overall, our findings suggest that the estimates for males and females separately are 
not particularly different from the combined estimates presented in Table 3 for fertility 
outcomes, i.e. the estimates are mainly positive but statistically insignificant across age 
groups. However, there are positive and significant effects of MFI membership on 
contraceptive use when females borrow while male borrowing has no effects and 
across gender these estimates are mainly positive and statistically significant.  
It appears that our PSM results robustly37 support the findings of the general literature 
on MF and contraceptive use but not necessarily on fertility and we can only partly 
support the PKML findings. Thus, using the same data but different methods we obtain 
somewhat different results; but does this allow us to reach any strong conclusions as to 
the impact of MF on contraceptive use and fertility? In the next section we subject our 
results to sensitivity analysis shedding light on this issue by examining the robustness 
of our matching estimates.  
Sensitivity analysis 
Although we found statistically significant effects using PSM it is questionable whether 
these are robust to unobservables. Rosenbaum (2002) developed sensitivity analysis to 
explore the robustness of matching estimates to selection on unobservables 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) argue that ‘sensitivity analysis 
should always accompany the presentation of matching estimates’ (19). 
Rosenbaum (2002) invites us to imagine a number Γ (gamma)    1) which captures the 
degree of association, of an unobserved characteristic with the treatment and outcome, 
required for it (the unobserved characteristic) to explain the observed impact. Γ is the 
ratio of the odds that the treated have this unobserved characteristic to the odds that 
the controls have it; a low odds ratio (near to one) indicates that it is not unlikely that 
such an unobserved variable exists. Cornfield et al (1959) use the example of the effect 
of smoking on lung cancer. In this case, which is now surely without doubt, data from 
the late 1950s gives a gamma > 5 for such an unobserved variable, which is, it is 
suggested, highly unlikely to have been unobserved because of its strong association 
between smoking and death. 
This approach can be implemented using the mhbounds procedure in STATA (Becker 
and Caliendo, 2007); this procedure is suitable for binary outcome variables and uses 
the matching estimates to calculate the lower and upper bounds of the outcome 
                                                 
37 As mentioned before, robustness checks were conducted. E.g. pscore was applied across the various 
matching algorithms. The various results obtained did not vary dramatically which suggests some 
degree of robustness.  
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variable for different values of Γ. If the lowest Γ is relatively small (say < 2) then one 
may assert that the likelihood of an unobserved characteristic is relatively high and 
therefore that the estimated impact is rather sensitive to the existence of unobservables 
(DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). 
Sensitivity analysis can be illustrated by calculating the Γ at which the estimated impact 
of microfinance participation on the outcome variables presented here is no longer 
statistically significant. E.g. Table 3 shows that the kernel matching impact estimate 
with a bandwidth of 0.05 for contraceptive use for the ages 14-30 is 0.056 which is 
statistically significant at 5%. However, this may not be due to membership per se but to 
unobserved characteristics that account for membership (and or its impact). Sensitivity 
analysis explores the vulnerability of this impact estimate to selection on 
unobservables.  
Table 5 reports the mhbounds results, presenting the minimum and maximum values 
for the Mantel-Haenszel bounds along with their significance levels. If the value for the 
maximum significance level is above 0.05, then the result would no longer be 
significant at the 5% level, if the value is above 0.10, then the result would no longer be 
significant at 10%. In this case, the results are no longer significant at relatively low 
levels of Γ, i.e. for a Γ of 1.05; the result for contraceptive use aged 14-30 already 
becomes insignificant at 5% and for a Γ of 1.15 they are no longer significant at 10%. 
This implies that a relatively small increase in the likelihood of being a participant due 
to an unobservable characteristic which also increases the benefits from borrowing is 
required to explain the observed impact. It is not unlikely that such an unobserved 
confounding variable exists. Consequently, we suggest, the observed impact of 
microfinance membership on contraceptive use may well be confounded by one or 
more unobserved variables associated with both MFI borrowing and this impact and 
caution is required interpreting these results. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for contraceptive use ages 14-30 for microfinance 
participants 
 Mantel-Haenszel bounds Significance level 
Gamma (Γ) Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
1 1.852 1.852 0.032 0.032 
1.05 1.579 2.128 0.017 0.057 
1.1 1.317 2.391 0.008 0.094 
1.15 1.068 2.643 0.004 0.143 
1.2 0.830 2.884 0.002 0.203 
1.25 0.601 3.117 0.001 0.274 
1.3 0.382 3.341 0.000 0.351 
Source: Authors calculations. 
Similar observations can be made when looking at contraceptive use for the ages 14-50; 
for a Γ of 1.3 the result become insignificant at 5% and for a Γ of 1.35 they are no longer 
significant at 10%. For contraceptive use for the ages 30-50, the result becomes 
insignificant at 5% when Γ is 1.25 and insignificant at 10% when Γ is 1.35. Similar 
observations can be made for the fertility outcome variables38.  
Further research 
To enrich this paper we initially wanted to further investigate the claims made by 
Steele et al (2001) that membership is a better indicator for MF participation than 
amount borrowed. However, whether we use MF membership or amount borrowed as 
a treatment variable does not make much of a difference in our case since all MF 
borrowers are also members. In the case of Steele et al (2001) there is a slight 
discrepancy in this regard, they report more members than borrowers. But given a bit 
more time we will investigate this claim further and try various approaches in STATA 
to match with continuous treatment variables.  
Furthermore, we would like to investigate the various matching methods in more 
depth. King et al (2011) argue that PSM is unreliable and Mahalanobis matching or 
coarsened exact matching (CEM) generally outperform PSM and should be preferred. It 
                                                 
38 The sensitivity analysis results for the remaining outcome variables can be obtained from the authors 
upon request. 
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is worth investigating this claim further since PSM is frequently heralded as a magic 
bullet but often not examined critically enough.  
Also, we would like to analyse the data as a panel and examine the effects of MF on 
contraceptive use and fertility over time using the follow-up round of the PnK data 
collected in 1998/99. In addition, we obtained the empowerment data set used by Pitt et 
al (2006) and would like to add this into the panel to further investigate the link 
between women’s empowerment, family planning and MF.  
Conclusion 
The literature suggests that MF has positive impacts on contraceptive use and negative 
impacts of fertility. The study by PKML throws doubts on these findings arguing that 
most of these studies have not accounted for self-selection and non-random 
programme placement bias. PKML propose an advanced econometric strategy that 
controls for these biases. They examine the impact of MF by gender of borrower and 
find that female borrowing has significantly negative effects on contraceptive use and 
weak positive as well as negative effects on fertility; male borrowing has mainly 
positive but insignificant effects on contraceptive use and significantly negative effects 
on fertility. 
The findings of PKML are interesting and challenging given the difficulties of 
replicating PnK’s data and the questionable estimation strategy that has been the 
subject of ongoing controversy. We replicate the PKML variables with some difficulty 
and triangulate our results successfully with RnM. When we apply PSM to the data and 
follow Steele et al (2001) in using a dichotomous MFI membership variable as the 
indicator for MF participation, we obtain results which indicate that MF participation 
has positive and significant impacts on contraceptive use (contrary to PKML at least for 
females)  and positive, albeit insignificant, impacts on fertility across gender. We find 
few differences when the gender of the borrower is taken into account. Hence, our PSM 
results confirm the findings of the broader MF literature on contraceptive use but not 
on fertility, and we can only partially confirm the PKML findings with (our variable 
constructions of) their data (the remaining differences in our data reconstruction 
compared to PKML are outlined in Appendix 3). Sensitivity analysis has shown that the 
PSM estimates presented here are highly vulnerable to selection on unobservables and 
so we cannot be confident about causality between MF membership and FP outcomes.  
The evidence of the impact of MF on contraceptive use and fertility remains 
contradictory and unreliable. One set of data subjected to different estimation methods 
leads to different results. This raises doubts about the econometric techniques 
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employed and we concur with Leamer (1983) who criticises the key assumptions many 
econometric methods are built on and complains about ‚the whimsical character of 
econometric inference‛ (p. 38). We can only conclude that the evidence of MF impact 
on contraceptive use and fertility presented in this paper is weak, i.e. vulnerability of 
estimates to selection on unobservables and partially contradictory to PKML findings, 
this also implies weaknesses in the underlying data and the research design and the 
inability of advanced econometric methods to compensate for unsatisfactory data and 
thus the evidence presented in this paper does not allow us to draw any strong 
conclusions.  
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Appendix 1: Weighted means and standard deviations  
Variables 
PKML1 Authors, estimation sample 
Number 
of Obs 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number 
of Obs 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Age of woman 1,733 30.00 9.00 1,841 29.65 9.14 
Age of household head 
(years) 
1,757 40.82 12.80 1,841 41.78 12.24 
Highest grade completed 
by HH head 
1,757 2.49 3.50 1,841 2.47 3.44 
Highest grade completed 
by any female HH member 
1,757 1.61 2.85 1,841 1.65 2.95 
Highest grade completed 
by any male HH member 
1,757 3.08 3.80 1,841 3.28 3.96 
Sex of household head 
(male=1) 
1,757 0.95 0.22 1,841 1.01 0.12 
Household land (decimals) 1,757 76.14 108.54 1,841 100.16 337.33 
Parents of HH head own 
land? 
1,725 0.26 0.56 1,841 0.27 0.59 
Brothers of HH head own 
land? 
1,725 0.82 1.31 1,841 0.68 1.20 
Sisters of HH head own 
land? 
1,725 0.76 1.21 1,841 0.71 1.16 
Parents of HH head’s 
spouse own land? 
1,735 0.53 0.78 1,841 0.56 0.80 
Brothers of HH head’s 
spouse own land? 
1,735 0.92 1.43 1,841 0.95 1.46 
Sisters of HH head’s 
spouse own land? 
1,735 0.75 1.20 1,841 0.79 1.24 
No spouse in HH 1,757 0.13 0.33 1,841 0.03 0.16 
Nontarget HH 1,757 0.30 0.46 1,841 0.14 0.01 
Has any primary school? 1,757 0.69 0.46 1,841 0.69 0.46 
Has rural health center? 1,757 0.30 0.46 1,841 0.06 0.24 
Has family planning 
center? 
1,757 0.10 0.30 1,841 0.09 0.29 
Is dai/midwife available? 1,757 0.67 0.47 1,841 0.68 0.47 
Price of rice 1,757 11.15 0.85 1,841 10.54 0.63 
Price of wheat flour 1,757 9.59 1.00 1,841 9.09 0.77 
Price of mustard oil 1,757 52.65 5.96 1,841 53.65 4.19 
Price of hen egg 1,757 2.46 1.81 1,841 2.35 0.68 
Price of milk 1,757 12.54 3.04 1,841 12.27 2.49 
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Price of potato 1,757 3.74 1.60 1,841 6.94 0.93 
Average female wage 1,757 16.15 9.61 1,841 17.97 6.73 
Dummy variable for no 
female wage 
1,757 0.19 0.40 1,841 0.02 0.16 
Average male wage 1,757 37.89 9.40 1,841 36.66 6.93 
Distance to bank (km) 1,757 3.49 2.85 1,841 3.50 2.90 
Amount borrowed by 
female from BRAC (Taka) 
183 4,678.41 3,561.60 190 4,908.72 3,817.90 
Amount borrowed by male 
from BRAC (Taka) 
70 5,685.99 7,091.58 70 7,026.62 9,276.42 
Amount borrowed by 
female from BRDB (Taka) 
108 4,094.27 1,931.91 124 3,943.59 2,146.84 
Amount borrowed by male 
from BRDB (Taka) 
180 5,996.86 6,202.16 202 5,943.38 5,886.96 
Amount borrowed by 
female from GB (Taka) 
233 14,123.59 9,302.40 242 15,622.64 9,754.91 
Amount borrowed by male 
from GB (Taka) 
85 16,468.14 10,580.00 93 18,017.39 10,976.07 
Outcome variables2       
Contraceptive use by 
currently married women 
aged 14-30 
1,058 0.398 0.490 1,142 0.377 0.485 
Contraceptive use by 
currently married women 
aged 14-50 
1,731 0.378 0.485 1,841 0.379 0.485 
Contraceptive use by 
currently married women 
aged 14-50 
n/a n/a n/a 1,841 0.179 0.383 
Any child born in last 4 
years to currently married 
women aged 14-30 (yes=1; 
no=0) 
1,056 0.697 0.460 1,142 0.669 0.471 
Any child born in last 4 
years to currently married 
women aged 14-50 (yes=1; 
no=0) 
1,729 0.553 0.497 1,841 0.532 0.499 
Notes:  
1. Source: PKML, table 2, p. 10.  
2. Values for outcome variables are for all individuals across all villages. 
PKML descriptive statistics are not on the estimation sample while our descriptive are on our estimation 
sample. There are slight differences in the number of observations; PKML run the majority of their 
descriptive statistics on a sample of 1,757 households while our sample is 1,841 households. PKML argue 
that they restrict their sample to those households with less than 5 acres of land owned and hence 
excluded 41 additional households from the overall sample of 1,798 (PKML, p. 10, footnote 8).  
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Appendix 2: Headline findings of PKML 
Outcome variable Headline findings 
Contraceptive use 14-50 (Table 5) 
Female 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Male 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB  
 
Contraceptive use 14-30 (Table 5) 
Female 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB  
 
Male 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Fertility 14-50 (Table 7) 
Female 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Male 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
 
Fertility 14-30 (Table 7) 
Female 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB  
 
Male 
BRAC 
BRDB 
GB 
probit/wesml-probit/wesml-liml/wesml-fe/wesml-liml-fe 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (sig)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (sig)/+ive (ns) 
-ive (sig)/-ive (sig)/-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (ns) 
 
wesml-liml-fe 
 
-ive (sig) 
-ive (sig) 
-ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns) 
-ive (ns) 
 
probit/wesml-probit/wesml-liml/wesml-fe/wesml-liml-fe 
 
+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (sig) 
-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
-ive (sig)/-ive (sig)/-ive (ns)/ +ive (sig)/-ive (ns) 
 
 
-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/+ive (ns) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
+ive (ns)/+ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (ns)/-ive (sig) 
 
wesml-liml-fe 
 
 +ive (ns) 
 +ive (ns) 
 -ive (sig) 
 
 
+ive (ns) 
-ive (sig) 
-ive (sig) 
Source: PKML. 
Note: The results in bold obtained from WESML-LIML-FE are according to PKML the most reliable since 
they control for all major sources of bias (p. 14). 
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Appendix 3: Main differences between RnM and authors’ findings for round 1- 3:  
Variables RnM 
variable 
names  
Authors variable names Explanation, R 1-3 RnM 
SQL 
File 
Non-land 
assets 
nlasset 
fnlasset 
nonlandasset 
nonlandwomen 
We used the same variables as RnM – see 
their SQL file. RnMs average values for both 
variables are lower than ours, though this is 
misleading since RnM do not have any data 
for round 3 as a round by round 
comparison shows. RnMs respective round 
1 and 2 values for nlasset are in fact higher 
than ours and the opposite applies for their 
fnlasset values. We follow our 
interpretation. 
dbo.
HHa
ssets 
Landed 
assets 
flandvala 
flandvalb 
landbef 
landaft 
landvala 
landvalb 
landawomenval 
landbwomenval 
halab 
halaa 
halaa_tot 
halab_tot 
We used the same variables as RnM – see 
their SQL file. There is no difference in 
landaft and halaa. The remaining variables 
still have a few discrepancies. RnM assumes 
that landbef is equal to halaa if halab is 
equal to 0, hence the differences. We follow 
our interpretation. 
dbo.i
ndivi
dual 
land 
dbo.
HH 
land 
Eligibility eligible 
eligbrac 
eligbrdb 
eliggram 
 
 
 
q 
r 
bracvill 
brdbvill 
gramvill 
villprog 
elig_defacto 
elig_defacto_brac 
elig_defacto_brdb 
elig_defacto_gb 
elig_dejure_brac 
elig_dejure_brdb 
elig_dejure_gb 
elig_defacto_treat/elig_defacto 
elig_dejure_treat/elig_dejure 
bracvill_MD 
brdbvill_MD 
gbvill_MD 
vill_prog_rpj 
Differences for 183 hh 
   ‚                 ‚   79 hh 
   ‚                 ‚   24 hh 
   ‚                 ‚   61 hh 
   ‚                 ‚    30hh 
   ‚                 ‚   29hh 
   ‚                 ‚   42hh 
   ‚                 ‚   1386 hh / 569 hh 
   ‚                 ‚   1245 hh / 1599 hh 
Spot on. 
Spot on. 
Spot on. 
Spot on. 
A few differences, mainly because RnM 
assume landbef is equal to halaa if halab is 
equal to 0. This does not seem justifiable 
and we follow our own interpretation. 
dbo.
HH 
progr
am 
statu
s 
 
